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Trial Tactics

Judicial Innovations
to Screen Eyewitness
Identifications
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG

I

n a decision announced November 29, 2012,
the Oregon Supreme Court reconsidered, after
30 years, the role that trial judges must play in
Oregon courts to screen eyewitness identification.
The case, State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012),
actually consolidated two separate criminal appeals
in order to broadly consider eyewitness identifications. The first defendant, Samuel Adam Lawson,
was convicted of five counts of aggravated murder,
three counts of attempted aggravated murder, and
two counts of first-degree robbery (State v. Lawson);
the second defendant, Stanley Dale James Jr., was
convicted of second-degree robbery, harassment,
and third-degree theft (State v. James).

The Facts of Lawson

The facts of Lawson illustrate the problems eyewitnesses often have in making identifications. On
August 21, 2003, Noris and Sherl Hilde drove with
their trailer to a campsite where Noris had pitched a
tent the prior weekend to claim the spot. They found
Lawson in the tent and his yellow truck parked in
their parking space. Lawson apologized, saying he
thought the tent was abandoned; he then moved to
a nearby vacant campsite.
Later that evening, as she stood at the window of
the trailer, Sherl was shot in the chest with a large
caliber hunting rifle. Noris, was then shot and killed
while trying to call 911. When the 911 dispatcher
called back, Sherl told the dispatcher that she and
her husband were shot and that she did not know
who shot them, but “they” (the shooter or shooters) wanted the Hildes’ truck. Emergency personnel
found Sherl lying in the trailer in critical condition,
and transported her via ambulance and helicopter to a hospital. An ambulance attendant said she
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was hysterical and continued to refer to the shooter
as “they,” but also said the shooter was the man at
their campsite; she even claimed that the pilot of
the helicopter was the shooter. At the hospital, she
immediately went into surgery.
Two days later, the police attempted to interview
Sherl while she was heavily medicated with her hands
restrained to keep her from removing a breathing
tube. Unable to speak, she could respond to questions only by moving her head. The police showed
her a black-and-white photo line-up that included
a picture of the defendant, who had volunteered to
police that he encountered the couple the day they
were shot. Sherl indicated she could not identify any
photo, but she nodded “yes” to three leading questions: Had she seen the shooter earlier in the day?
Had the shooter been in the Hildes’ tent? Did the
shooter drive a yellow truck?
Two weeks later, the police again interviewed
Sherl at the hospital. This time, she could speak and
told the police that the shooter entered the trailer
after her husband was shot, but she could not see
the man because it was dark and he put a pillow
over her face. She was apologetic that she could not
be more helpful to the police, but she did not think
she could identify anyone. About two weeks after
that, Sherl was again interviewed and told the police
that, despite the pillow over her face, she briefly saw
the shooter though she was still unable to pick him
out of a photo line-up. She added that the perpetrator was wearing a dark shirt and a baseball cap,
but did not indicate he was the same man who had
been in their tent.
In an interview a week later, Sherl reviewed her
answers to the leading questions she had been asked
at the first interview. She had no recollection of the
interview, but for the first time told the police that
she believed the shooter was the man who had been
in their tent earlier in the day. She stated she could
not “swear to it” and did not think she could pick
him out of a line-up. The police told her the man she
identified was Samuel Lawson and he was in custody.
Later, while convalescing, a rehabilitation worker
showed Sherl a newspaper with a photograph of
Lawson that identified him as the suspect arrested
for the shootings. Then, about a month before trial,
and two years after the shootings, police investigators showed her a single photograph of Lawson
wearing a dark shirt and a dark hat with white lettering and took her to a pretrial hearing where she
observed him. Inadvertently, Sherl then came upon
one of the previous photographic line-ups she had
been shown. This time, she identified Lawson as the
shooter, and went on to testify at his trial that Lawson was the shooter. The trial judge denied a motion
to exclude the identification.
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The Facts of James

In James, Officer Gomez arrived at a local Safeway in response to a morning theft complaint. He
discovered that the thieves were gone and interviewed employees who gave a description of two
suspects that Gomez included in an incident report.
One store clerk said he heard the “clanging” of bottles and then came upon a “large Indian” and a
“small Indian” stuffing 40-ounce bottles of beer
into a backpack. The clerk reported this to a manager, identified the two men as they were leaving,
and the two Safeway employees pursued the men
while yelling for them to stop. The smaller man left
the store while the larger man blocked the exit. The
store clerk tried to get around the larger man, and
the larger man resisted and punched the manager as
he swung at the clerk and missed. The two suspects
ran across the parking lot and drove away.
The employees described the larger man as approximately 220 pounds, wearing a white tank top and baggy
blue jeans, and the smaller man as approximately five
feet tall, 110 pounds, and wearing a long black coat
with a hood, baggy blue pants, and a backpack.
Later that day, Gomez observed two men who
matched the descriptions. He approached the two,
both of whom appeared intoxicated, and they denied
having been at the Safeway. Gomez obtained consent
to search one man’s backpack and discovered one
unopened 40-ounce bottle of Steel Reserve 211 malt
liquor and a denim jacket. Gomez obtained consent
to take both men to the Safeway, where they were
identified by the clerk and manager. Gomez testified at a suppression hearing almost two years later
that he said something like “Is this them?” before the
Safeway employees made the identification.
The trial judge denied a motion to suppress the
out-of-court and in-court identifications. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Old Law

The lower courts relied upon State v. Classen, 590
P.2d 1198 (Or. 1979), in making their rulings. That
decision established a two-step process for evaluating identifications. First, the judge must decide
whether the underlying identification process had
either been suggestive or needlessly departed from
procedures designed to avoid such suggestiveness. If
so, the judge must then decide (1) whether the witness
had based the identification at issue on an independent source separate from the suggestive elements, or
(2) whether other aspects of the identification substantially excluded the risk that it had been influenced
by the suggestive elements. In the second step, judges
could consider, inter alia, five factors: (1) the opportunity that the witness had to clearly view the persons
involved in the crime; (2) the attention that he or she
gave to their identifying features; (3) the timing and

completeness of the description given by the witness
after the event; (4) the degree of certainty expressed
by the witness in describing the persons involved in
the crime and making subsequent identifications; and
(5) the lapse of time between the original observation
and the subsequent identification.
The Classen court relied on the US Supreme
Court’s 1977 decision in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
U.S. 98, for these factors and for the proposition that
reliability was the linchpin in determinations regarding the admissibility of identification testimony, but
decided the case on the basis of Oregon evidence law
rather than under the due process clause.

Lawson and Evidence Law

The Lawson court observed that the most recent
United States Supreme Court case on identifications emphasized the role that state evidence law can
play in excluding unreliable identifications. (Perry
v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 181 (2012).) It
explained that much had changed since its 1979
Classen decision:
Since 1979—the year that this court decided
Classen—there have been more than 2,000 scientific studies conducted on the reliability of
eyewitness identification. Amici curiae in these
two cases—particularly the Innocence Network and a group of academics and university
professors who have conducted, published, and
reviewed a wide range of scientific research
on the subject of eyewitness identification—
submitted extensive data and analysis to this
court regarding many of those studies. Based
on our extensive review of the current scientific research and literature, we conclude that
the scientific knowledge and empirical research
concerning eyewitness perception and memory
has progressed sufficiently to warrant taking
judicial notice of the data contained in those
various sources as legislative facts that we may
consult for assistance in determining the effectiveness of our existing test for the admission
of eyewitness identification evidence.
(Lawson, 291 P.3d at 685.)
The court explained that it found in the research
that the factors affecting the reliability of identifications can be grouped in two categories: system
variables and estimator variables.
System variables refer to the circumstances surrounding the identification procedure itself that
are generally within the control of those administering the procedure. Estimator variables, by
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contrast, generally refer to characteristics of the
witness, the alleged perpetrator, and the environmental conditions of the event that cannot
be manipulated or adjusted by state actors.
(Id.)
The court identified the system variables as blind
administration, pre-identification instructions, line-up
construction, simultaneous versus sequential line-ups,
show-ups, multiple viewings, suggestive questioning, co-witness and other contamination, suggestive
feedback, and recording confidence. It identified the
estimator variables as stress, witness attention, duration of exposure, environmental viewing conditions,
witness characteristics and conditions, description,
perpetrator characteristics, speed of identification,
level of certainty, and memory decay.
Considering all of these variables, the court
concluded that Classen failed to ensure that only
sufficiently reliable identifications are admitted. It
reasoned that the Classen first step conflated evidentiary principles with due process analysis and
that under state evidence law “there is no reason
to hinder the analysis of eyewitness reliability with
purposeless distinctions between suggestiveness and
other sources of unreliability.” (Id. at 688–89.) The
court explained that “[w]hen a criminal defendant
has challenged the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence by an appropriate pretrial motion,
the manner in which Classen apportions the burden of proof in identification matters reflects more
concern for due process principles than principles
of evidence law.” (Id. at 689.) This is because it is
the defendant who must allege a constitutional violation. In contrast, it is the proponent of evidence
such as identifications who normally bears the initial burden of establishing admissibility.
The court also recognized problems with the second step in Classen because trial courts applying the
Classen factors rely heavily on the eyewitnesses’ selfreports regarding suggestibility, whereas there was
persuasive evidence to show that suggestive procedures can inflate the self-reported evidence regarding
suggestiveness factors.

Problems and Necessity

The court recognized both the problems with eyewitness identification as well as its importance. As
for the problems, the court wrote:
[I]n Classen, this court acknowledged that “extensive research and commentary by psychologists
and jurists on the dangers of misidentification
and ways to minimize them stretches back at
least half a century” and “that the unreliability of eyewitness identification under suggestive

circumstances is widely recognized.” That said,
a perfect solution to the problem of misidentification has thus far eluded us, a difficulty that
may lie in the fact that, while empirical evidence
suggests that a certain percentage of eyewitness
identifications are incorrect, we often have no
way to determine whether or not a particular
eyewitness is accurate in identifying a specific
individual. As we previously observed, although
the scientific studies we have reviewed have identified a number of factors that contribute to the
likelihood of mistaken identification, nearly all
of those factors are probabilistic in nature—
they can indicate only a statistical likelihood of
misidentification within a broad population of
people studied, not whether any one identification is right or wrong.
(Id. at 690 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).)
As for the importance of such testimony, the
court wrote that “[d]espite those shortcomings, eyewitness evidence can be extremely probative of guilt
and, in many cases, may be the only evidence connecting a guilty defendant to a crime.” (Id.) The
court concluded that “[t]herefore, we must attempt
to strike a proper balance between the utility of that
evidence in convicting the guilty and its proclivity,
on occasion, to inculpate the innocent.” (Id.)

The Solution

The court turned for a solution to the Oregon Evidence Code (OEC). It stated that, when a defendant
makes a pretrial motion to suppress eyewitness
identification, judges should recognize that such
identification will almost always be relevant under
OEC 401 (similar to Federal Rule of Evidence
(FRE) 401), but that OEC 602 and 701 (similar to
FRE 602 and 701) become important. OEC 602
requires that the proponent of eyewitness identification “must offer evidence showing both that the
witness had an adequate opportunity to observe or
otherwise personally perceive the facts to which the
witness will testify, and did, in fact, observe or perceive them, thereby gaining personal knowledge of
the facts.” (Lawson, 291 P.3d at 692.)
OEC 701, the court ruled, requires the following:
[T]he first part of an OEC 701 inquiry requires
that the trial court initially consider what the
witness actually perceived (essentially, the
OEC 602 inquiry described above), and then
determine whether the witness’s identification of the defendant was “rationally based”
on those perceptions. To satisfy its burden,
the proponent of the identification evidence
(generally the state) must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the witness perceived sufficient facts to support an
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inference of identification and that the identification was, in fact, based on those perceptions.
Initially, the proponent of the evidence must
establish that the witness could make a rational inference of identification from the facts
that the witness actually perceived. Human
facial features will ordinarily be sufficiently
distinctive to serve as a rational basis for an
inference of identification. Thus, a witness who
got a clear look at the perpetrator’s face could
rationally base a subsequent identification on
a comparison of facial features, even if the
witness was unable to verbally communicate
every specific similarity between the two faces.
Conversely, nonfacial features like race, height,
weight, clothing, or hair color, generally lack
the level of distinction necessary to permit
the witness to identify a specific person as the
person whom the witness saw. If, for example,
a witness testified to observing a tall, darkhaired man of medium build from behind as
he ran from the scene of the crime, the trial
court permissibly could find that the witness
had personal knowledge of the height, build,
clothing, and hair color of the perpetrator, but
no more, and limit the testimony accordingly.
When a witness’s perceptions are capable of
supporting an inference of identification, but
are nevertheless met with competing evidence
of an impermissible basis for that inference—
i.e., suggestive police procedures—an issue
of fact arises as to whether the witness’s subsequent identification was derived from a
permissible or impermissible basis. When there
are facts demonstrating that a witness could
have relied on something other than his or her
own perceptions to identify the defendant, the
state—as the proponent of the identification—
must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the identification was based on
a permissible basis rather than an impermissible one, such as suggestive police procedures.
(Lawson, 291 P.3d at 693.)
The court added that the eyewitness testimony
must be helpful to the jury, which it usually will be, but:
it is conceivable that some statements of identification might not be particularly helpful to a jury.
Consider, for example, the witness who observes

a masked perpetrator with prominently scarred
or tattooed hands. Although those features could
be distinctive enough to provide a rational basis
for an inference of identification, a jury may be
equally capable of making the same inference
by comparing the witness’s description of those
markings to objective evidence of the actual
markings on the defendant.
(Id.)
The court added that a trial judge must consider
whether the probative value of identification evidence is substantially outweighed by dangers of
unfair prejudice, and “in cases in which an eyewitness has been exposed to suggestive police
procedures, trial courts have a heightened role as an
evidentiary gatekeeper because ‘traditional’ methods
of testing reliability—like cross-examination—can
be ineffective at discrediting unreliable or inaccurate eyewitness identification evidence.” (Id. at 695.)
The court pointed out the potential importance
of expert testimony:
Because many of the system and estimator
variables that we described earlier are either
unknown to the average juror or contrary
to common assumptions, expert testimony
is one method by which the parties can educate the trier of fact concerning variables that
can affect the reliability of eyewitness identification. Expert testimony may also provide
an avenue to introduce and explain scientific
research or other indicia of reliability not specifically addressed by our opinion in these cases.
In that regard, the use of experts may prove
vital to ensuring that the law keeps pace with
advances in scientific knowledge, thus enabling
judges and jurors to evaluate eyewitness identification testimony according to relevant and
meaningful criteria. Of course, expert testimony
must be predicated on scientific research; must
meet the threshold admissibility requirements
for scientific evidence; and must be relevant to
a disputed issue in the case, such that the testimony will assist the jury in resolving that issue.
(Id. at 696 (citation omitted).)
Having set forth a new approach to eyewitness
testimony, the court predicted:
that the trial courts will continue to admit
most eyewitness identifications. . . . because,
although possible, it is doubtful that issues
concerning one or more of the estimator
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variables that we have identified will, without
more, be enough to support an inference of
unreliability sufficient to justify the exclusion
of the eyewitness identification.
(Id. at 697.)

Conclusion

In Lawson, the court reversed and remanded for a
new trial and stated that “the parties must be permitted on retrial to (1) supplement the record with
any additional evidence that may bear on the reliability of the eyewitness identifications at issue here,
and (2) present arguments regarding the appropriate application of the new procedures set out in
this opinion.” (Id. at 698–99.) In James, the court
“conclude[d] that, unlike Lawson, application of
the revised test that we have established here could
not have resulted in the exclusion of the eyewitness
identification evidence” and accordingly affirmed
the conviction. (Id. at 699.)
Other state courts have expressed concern about
the dangers of erroneous convictions based on eyewitness identifications. One example cited by the

Oregon Supreme Court is the opinion of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d
872 (N.J. 2011), together with the report of the special master engaged in that case.
Footnote 5 of Lawson highlights that court’s
concern: “Eyewitness misidentification has contributed to date to 72 percent of the 301 wrongful
convictions revealed by DNA evidence.” (Lawson,
291 P.3d at 690 n.5 (citing Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, Innocence Project, http://
tinyurl.com/25frwdr (last visited Apr. 14, 2013);
Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent:
Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong 48
(2011) (reporting that 76 percent of the first 250
convictions overturned due to DNA evidence since
1989 involved eyewitness misidentification)).)
Prosecutors, along with judges and defense
lawyers, desire to prevent wrongful convictions,
including those based on eyewitness identification.
The hope is that all concerned will cooperate in state
experiments that might lead to better investigative
procedures and judicial controls that will reduce the
danger of convicting the innocent. n
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